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Abstract
The introduction of explicit notions of rejection,
or disbelief, into logics for knowledge represen-
tation can be justified in a number of ways. Moti-
vations range from the need for versions of nega-
tion weaker than classical negation, to the ex-
plicit recording of classic belief contraction op-
erations in the area of belief change, and the ad-
ditional levels of expressivity obtained from an
extended version of belief change which includes
disbelief contraction. In this paper we present
four logics of disbelief which address some or all
of these intuitions. Soundness and completeness
results are supplied and the logics are compared
with respect to applicability and utility.
1 Introduction
The introduction of explicit notions of belief rejection or
disbelief into logics for knowledge representation can be
justified in a number of ways. One such justification is
found in the research area of belief change [1, 3]. Classic
belief change recognises two basic operations on the be-
liefs of an agent: revision, where the aim is to incorporate
a new belief into an agent’s belief state while still main-
taining consistency, and contraction, where an agent needs
to discard one of its beliefs while, at the same time, trying
to retain as many of its remaining beliefs as possible. The
argument for introducing explicit disbeliefs into the object
language of choice is based on the conviction that belief
contraction should be seen as a belief change operation on
par with revision, and not just as an intermediate step for
performing revision, as it is sometimes presented. The fol-
lowing example, based on an example in [9], but originally
found in [4], illustrates the point.1
1Observe that this is an example of base change [2, 7, 11].
Example 1 Consider the situation where a totally ignorant
agent revises its current (empty) belief base with p → q,
then contracts with q, and then revises with p. In a frame-
work which caters for the explicit representation of beliefs
only, the principle of informational economy2 dictates that
there is only one feasible result for this sequence of base
change operations: the set {p → q, p}. The argument
against the claim that this is the only acceptable outcome
is that, because the representational framework does not
allow for the explicit recording of the contraction of q, the
choice of permissible outcomes is skewed in favour of re-
vision operations. Contrast this with a situation in which
disbelieving a sentence φ can be represented in the object
language as a sentence of the form φ. In this case the sets
{p→ q, q} and {q, p} will be acceptable outcomes as well.
In the example above, classical belief contraction is
equated with disbelief revision. But the extended version
of belief change in which it is also possible to perform
contraction with disbeliefs has no equivalent in classical
belief change. The contraction of disbeliefs provides for
a particularly interesting class of operations if disbeliefs
are thought of as guards against the introduction of certain
beliefs, in the spirit of default logic [10]. Disbelief con-
traction corresponds to the removal of such a guard, which
might then trigger the addition of previously suppressed be-
liefs into the current belief set of an agent. An adequate
modelling of this type of extended (dis)belief change re-
quires some level of interaction between beliefs and disbe-
liefs, something which has not been dealt with adequately
in the literature. It also presupposes a consequence rela-
tion which handles disbeliefs appropriately, since it allows
for contraction with disbeliefs which are consequences of
previously asserted disbeliefs.
Another motivation for the introduction of disbeliefs is that
it allows us to reason about rejected beliefs and their con-
sequences [12, 5, 6]. In this scenario the argument is that
2The methodological injunction that the revision process pre-
serve as many of the old beliefs as possible.
in many practical situations it makes more sense to adopt
a “negative stance”: to reason about how to reject new be-
liefs on the basis of rejecting old ones. Under these cir-
cumstances the focus is on the provision of an appropriate
consequence relation with regard to disbeliefs.
Yet another motivation for an explicit representation of dis-
beliefs is that it can be viewed as a weaker version of clas-
sical negation. The value of such an additional version of
negation is that it enables us to resolve well-known para-
doxes of belief such as the lottery paradox.
Example 2 Given a finite number of lottery tickets issued
in a particular week, I express doubt about the possibility
of any individual ticket winning the lottery, although I do
believe that exactly one of these tickets will win the lottery.
The lottery paradox would be resolved by replacing classi-
cal negation (I believe the claim that ticket number 113 will
not win the lottery) with the much weaker notion of disbe-
lief (I disbelieve the claim that ticket number 113 will win
the lottery). This should not be seen as an ad hoc response
to a particular paradox of belief. To the contrary, such a
weaker version of negation is prevalent in many practical
situations. Here is another example.
Example 3 I have two very good friends, Agnetha and
Bjo¨rn, who are the only suspects in the murder of my
friends Annifrid and Benny. I refuse to believe that Agnetha
was able to commit the murder (represented as the disbe-
lief a), and similarly for Bjo¨rn (represented as the disbelief
b). Yet, the evidence compels me to believe that one of them
committed the crime (represented as a ∨ b).
The challenge is to provide a formal definition of disbelief
in such a way that sentences of the form φ can be regarded
as a legitimate way of negating φ, while at the same time
ensuring the consistency of sets like {φ, ψ, φ ∨ ψ}.
In this paper we present four different logics of belief and
disbelief. Two of these logics, WBD and GBD have been
used implicitly in work on disbelief, but not in the form of
a logic of belief and disbelief. The first one, WBD, has
a very weak notion of consequence with regard to disbe-
liefs. It has been used for the explicit recording of belief
contraction operations in [9] and [4]. This logic provides
an extremely weak link between beliefs and disbeliefs. The
relation between beliefs and disbeliefs is made only via a
notion of consistency, and this is done for the sole purpose
of providing an accurate model of classical belief contrac-
tion in terms of disbeliefs.
The second logic, GBD, was presented in [5, 6], albeit in
a different form, and is a formalisation of the idea that it
is useful to reason about rejected beliefs and their con-
sequences. The notion of consequence, with regard to
disbeliefs, associated with GBD is stronger than that of
WBD. We argue in section 4 that it is too strong. On the
other hand, the connection between beliefs and disbeliefs
in GBD is just as weak as in WBD. We argue that it needs
to be strengthened.
The third logic, BD, is designed with the express intention
of obtaining a weaker version of classical negation. Its ver-
sion of consequence with respect to disbeliefs seems to be
pitched at just the right level. It is weaker than the version
provided by GBD, but stronger than that of WBD. And un-
like the cases for WBD and GBD there is a strong and
intuitively plausible connection between beliefs and disbe-
liefs. Indeed, one of the consequences of the belief in a
sentence ¬φ is that φ will be disbelieved (that is, φ will
hold), as befits a view of disbelief as a weaker version of
classical negation. It is our contention that BD is the most
useful of the logics introduced in this paper.
With the introduction of BN, the fourth and final logic to
be discussed, the aim is to take matters a step further by
obtaining new beliefs from existing disbeliefs. In the pro-
cess of doing so, however, disbelief collapses into classical
negation. That is, disbelieving φ becomes equivalent to be-
lieving ¬φ, and BN becomes equivalent to classical logic
in its level of expressivity.
In section 2 we present the language on which all of our
logics are based. In each of sections 3 to 6 we present
and discuss a logic of belief and disbelief. Each logic is
equipped with a proof-theoretic and a semantic version of
consequence. It is shown that these logics are all sound
and complete. In section 7 we draw conclusions and point
to future research.
1.1 Formal preliminaries
We assume a classical propositional logic PL with a lan-
guage LPL generated from a (possibly countably infinite)
set of propositional atoms, together with the the usual
propositional connectives, and with ⊥ and ⊤ as canonical
representatives of the set of contradictions and tautologies,
respectively. V is the set of classical valuations of PL. For
φ ∈ LPL, M(φ) is the set of models of φ. Classical deduc-
tion for PL is denoted by ⊢PL. For any setX we denote the
powerset of X (the set of all subsets of X) by PX . Given
a language L and a consequence relation ⊢X from PL to L
we let CX(Γ) = {α | Γ ⊢X α} be the consequence oper-
ation associated with ⊢X . For example, CPL denotes clas-
sical consequence for propositional logic. It is well-known
that CPL satisfies the properties of Inclusion: X ⊆ C(X),
Idempotency: C(X) = C(C(X)), Monotonicity: X ⊆ Y
implies C(X) ⊆ C(Y ), and Compactness: if φ ∈ C(X)
then φ ∈ C(Y ) for some finite subset Y of X .3 An opera-
3Instead of taking PL as our “basic logic” we can work with
any logic whose associated consequence relation satisfies these
tionC fromPL toPL is a Tarskian consequence operation
iff it satisfies Inclusion, Idempotency and Monotonicity.
2 A language for beliefs and disbeliefs
The language L on which we base all of the logics to be
presented is a simple extension of LPL. For each potential
belief φ, expressed as a sentence of LPL, there is a corre-
sponding potential disbelief φ.
Definition 1 L = LB ∪ LD, where LB = LPL is the set
of potential beliefs and LD = {φ | φ ∈ LP}, the set of
potential disbeliefs. An information set Γ is any subset of
L. The beliefs in Γ are defined as ΓB = LB ∩ Γ. The
disbeliefs in Γ are defined as ΓD = LD ∩ Γ.
We use φ and ψ to denote potential beliefs and α and β to
denote arbitrary sentences ofL (potential beliefs and disbe-
liefs). The language L is fairly restrictive in the sense that
− is not viewed as a propositional connective. Thus, we
cannot construct sentences of the form p ∨ q, for example.
The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, in many (but not all)
motivations for the introduction of disbeliefs, such a level
of expressivity is simply not necessary. And secondly, this
paper should be seen as a first step towards a description of
logics of belief and disbelief. Our intention is to treat − as
a full-blown “propositional” connective in future research.
3 The logic WBD
The first logic we consider is relatively weak in terms of
the consequences of explicit disbeliefs. The motivation for
the introduction of WBD is primarily for the explicit ex-
pression of classical belief contraction. It was used as such
in [4] and [9], albeit implicitly. A proof theory for WBD is
obtained from the following three inference rules.
(B) If ΓB ⊢PL φ then Γ ⊢ φ
(D⊥) If φ ⊢PL ⊥ then Γ ⊢ φ
(WD) If ψ ∈ ΓD and φ ⊢PL ψ then Γ ⊢ φ
(B) is a supraclassicality requirement. (D⊥) requires that
contradictions always be disbelieved, analogous to the case
of tautologies always being believed. (WD) requires that
disbelieving a sentence ψ leads to a disbelief in all those
sentences classically stronger than ψ.
Definition 2 In WBD, α can be deduced from an infor-
mation set Γ, written as Γ ⊢WBD α, iff (Γ, α) is in the
smallest binary relation from PL to L closed under (B),
(D⊥), and (WD).
four properties.
The logic WBD has a well-behaved Tarskian consequence
operation.
Proposition 1 CWBD satisfies Inclusion, Idempotency,
Monotonicity and Compactness.
Observe that beliefs and disbeliefs are completely decou-
pled in WBD. In particular, WBD satisfies the following
two properties which show that disbeliefs and beliefs are
only derivable from the set of disbeliefs and beliefs respec-
tively:
(B6→D) ∀Ω ⊆ LB and φ ∈ LB , Γ ⊢ φ iff ΓD ∪Ω ⊢ φ
(D 6→B) ∀∆ ⊆ LD and φ ∈ LB , Γ ⊢ φ iff ΓB ∪∆ ⊢ φ
Proposition 2 ⊢WBD satisfies (B 6→D) and (D 6→B).
In fact, the only way in which beliefs and disbeliefs
are related in WBD is by way of the notion of WBD-
inconsistency.
Definition 3 Γ is WB-inconsistent iff ΓB ⊢WBD ⊥. Γ is
WD-inconsistent iff ΓD ⊢WBD ⊤. Γ is WBD-inconsistent
iff Γ ⊢WBD φ and Γ ⊢WBD φ for some φ ∈ LB .
We have similar versions of inconsistency for the other log-
ics too.
We now turn to the semantics for WBD. A useful intuition
is to think of the beliefs in Γ as the information an agent has
acquired on its own, and each disbelief φ as information it
has obtained from a different source, informing it that φ
does not hold. The agent has more faith in its own capabil-
ities than in those of its sources, and information obtained
from its sources is therefore seen as less reliable. The in-
formation obtained from a specific source is independent of
the beliefs of the agent and the information obtained from
other sources. A model for WBD consists of a set of valua-
tions, corresponding to the worlds that the agent regards as
possible, together with a set of sets of valuations, with each
element of this set corresponding to the worlds that a par-
ticular source of the agent regards as possible. A potential
belief is satisfied in a model if it is true in all the worlds that
the agent regards as possible, and a potential disbelief φ is
satisfied in a model if at least one of the sources regards φ
as impossible. Satisfaction is denoted by .
Definition 4 A WBD-modelM is an ordered pair (M,N )
where M ⊆ V and ∅ ⊂ N ⊆ PV . For φ ∈ LB ,M  φ iff
M ⊆ M(φ). For φ ∈ LD, M  φ iff ∃N ∈ N such that
N ⊆M(¬φ).
In a WBD-model M = (M,N ), M represents the models
of the beliefs of the agent, and each N ∈ N represents
the models of a sentence that the source associated with N
holds to be possible. We require an agent to have at least
one source of information. That is, we require that N 6= ∅.
Entailment for WBD (denoted by WBD) is then defined
in the normal model-theoretic fashion.
Definition 5 M  Γ iff M  α ∀α ∈ Γ. Γ WBD α iff
M  α for every WBD-modelM s.t. M  Γ.
It turns out that the logic WBD is sound and complete.
Theorem 1 Γ ⊢WBD α iff Γ WBD α, for all α ∈ L.
Based on the semantics of WBD we can also define ap-
propriate notions of (un)satisfiability which, via theorem 1,
can be shown to coincide with inconsistency. We postpone
presentation of these details to the full version of this paper.
The logic WBD is, essentially, the logic on which the work
in [4] and [9] is based. Both these papers argue for an ex-
plicit expression of disbeliefs in order to maintain a record
of belief contraction. Although WBD seems adequate for
this purpose, at least in simple settings, two types of crit-
icisms can be levelled at it: the extreme weakness of the
notion of consequence associated with disbeliefs, and the
complete decoupling of beliefs and disbeliefs. These weak-
nesses become apparent in scenarios where it is appropriate
to perform various belief change operations on beliefs as
well as disbeliefs. So, while contracting with a belief might
correspond to revising with a disbelief, contracting with a
disbelief has no equivalent in classical belief change. And
such an operation is useful if disbeliefs are thought of as
guards against the introduction of certain information, in
the spirit of default logic [10]. The removal of such a guard
might then trigger the addition of beliefs into an agent’s
current belief set. An adequate modelling of this type of
extended (dis)belief change requires some level of inter-
action between beliefs and disbeliefs. It also presupposes
a consequence relation which handles disbeliefs appropri-
ately, since it allows for contraction with disbeliefs which
are consequences of previously asserted disbeliefs. In sec-
tion 4 we consider an attempt to rectify the weakness of
consequences derived from disbeliefs. In section 5 we ad-
dress this issue as well, and we also consider the the provi-
sion of a link between beliefs and disbeliefs.
4 The logic GBD
One way in which to address the weakness of the conse-
quences to be derived from disbeliefs is to regard conse-
quence, with respect to disbeliefs, as the exact dual of con-
sequence with respect to beliefs. This is the approach fol-
lowed in [6] where, interestingly enough, the reason for
defining such a logic is to define disbelief change.
Let ΓD = {¬φ | φ ∈ ΓD} and consider the following rule:
(GD) If ΓD ⊢PL ¬φ then Γ ⊢ φ
(GD) requires that the consequences of disbeliefs be the
exact dual of classical consequence. The proof theory for
the logic GBD is then obtained from WBD by replacing
(WD) with (GD).
Definition 6 In GBD α can be deduced from an informa-
tion set Γ, written as Γ ⊢GBD α, iff (Γ, α) is in the smallest
binary relation from PL to L closed under (B), (D⊥), and
(GD).
GBD also has a well-behaved Tarskian consequence oper-
ation.
Proposition 3 CGBD satisfies Inclusion, Idempotency,
Monotonicity and Compactness.
The logic GBD satisfies the following property, which was
proposed in [5].
(Rej) If Γ ⊢ β and Γ ⊢ ¬(α→ β) then Γ ⊢ α
(Rej) can be thought of as a version of the inference rule
Modus Tollens. In fact, if disbelief is replaced with classi-
cal negation, (Rej) coincides exactly with Modus Tollens.
GBD also has a complete decoupling of beliefs and disbe-
liefs, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4 ⊢GBD satisfies (B 6→D) and (D 6→B).
The three versions of inconsistency for GBD are defined as
for WBD.
Definition 7 Γ is GB-inconsistent iff ΓB ⊢GBD ⊥. Γ is
GD-inconsistent iff ΓD ⊢GBD ⊤. Γ is GBD-inconsistent
iff Γ ⊢GBD φ and Γ ⊢GBD φ for some φ ∈ LB .
Observe that beliefs and disbeliefs are related only by
GBD-inconsistency.
A semantics for GBD is obtained by considering only those
WBD-models in whichN has a single element. Intuitively,
all disbeliefs are obtained from a single source. This en-
sures that disbeliefs can be combined to obtain new dis-
beliefs, which allows for a stronger notion of consequence
regarding disbeliefs. GBD-entailment are defined as for
WBD.
Definition 8 A GBD-model is an ordered pair M =
(M,N) where M,N ⊆ V . For φ ∈ LB, M  φ iff
M ⊆ M(φ). For φ ∈ LD, M  φ iff N ⊆ M(¬φ).
M  Γ iff M  α ∀α ∈ Γ. Γ GBD α iff M  α for
every GBD-modelM s.t. M  Γ.
The logic GBD is sound and complete.
Theorem 2 Γ ⊢GBD α iff Γ GBD α, for all α ∈ L.
We postpone a full description of the appropriate versions
of unsatisfiability for GBD, which coincide with the three
versions of inconsistency for GBD, to the full version of
this paper.
The crucial difference between WBD and GBD is that
GBD combines disbeliefs to obtain new disbeliefs, which
allows for a much stronger notion of consequence with re-
spect to disbeliefs. In particular, GBD satisfies the follow-
ing property.
(D∨) If Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊢ ψ then Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ
It is our contention that such a property is undesirable for
a notion of disbelief. Since disbelief is not intended to be
equivalent to classical negation, it is reasonable to require
that it be possible to express notions not expressible in clas-
sical logic. One of these is agnosticism, in which an agent
refuses to commit to a potential belief or its negation. For-
mally, this amounts to both φ and ¬φ being consequences
of a consistent information set Γ. But if the consequence
relation satisfies (D∨), it means that the agent is forced to
accept φ ∨ ¬φ, and therefore⊤ as well. Disbelieving a tau-
tology amounts to GD-inconsistency. It is the analogue of
classical inconsistency (believing the negation of the tau-
tology), but with classical negation replaced by disbelief.
Now, if agnosticism in the sense described above leads to
inconsistency with respect to disbeliefs, it is an indication
that the consequence relation for GBD is too strong to ac-
count for a proper treatment of disbeliefs. In section 5 we
consider a logic which seems to be pitched at the right level
in this regard.
5 The logic BD
In this section we introduce a logic in which there is inter-
action between beliefs and disbeliefs. Disbelief is seen as a
weaker notion of classical negation. As a result, believing
the negation of a sentence also results in disbelieving that
sentence, although the converse relationship does not hold.
Interestingly enough, this coupling of beliefs and disbeliefs
comes about as a result of the introduction of the following
inference rule, which looks like a simple strengthening of
the consequence relation with respect to disbeliefs.
(D) If ψ ∈ ΓD and ΓB ∪ {φ} ⊢PL ψ then Γ ⊢ φ
(D) requires that disbelieving a sentence ψ also leads to a
disbelief in those sentences classically stronger than ψ, but
with respect to ΓB . Observe that (WD) is the special case
of (D) where ΓB = ∅. The difference between the rules
(GD), (WD) and (D) is perhaps best brought out through
an example:
Example 4 Consider our earlier example of the murder
mystery. Then (WD) commits me to the following: If I
refuse to believe that Agnetha killed Annifrid and Benny,
then I also refuse to believe that Agnetha and Bjo¨rn killed
them (a similar commitment is enforced by (D) and (GD)).
However, in addition, (D) commits me to: If I believe that
Agnetha is a Swede, I believe that if you killed Annifrid and
Benny then you are a murderer, and I refuse to believe that
a Swede can be a murderer, then I also refuse to believe that
Agnetha could have killed Annifrid and Benny. This argu-
ment cannot be made with either (WD) or (GD). To further
illustrate the difference, consider what (GD) requires us to
infer in the lottery example. Consider for the time being,
a version with just two tickets. I believe that exactly one
of t1 or t2 will win the lottery; I refuse to believe that t1
wins the lottery and similarly for t2. Then (GD) compels
me to refuse to believe that exactly one of the two will win.
Therefore I end with a contradiction. In contrast, (D) and
(WD) do not require such a commitment.
From the example above it should be clear that both (D) and
(GD) are stronger than (WD). Furthermore, as the second
part of the example makes clear, since (D) is stronger than
(WD), some conclusions obtained from the former will not
be obtainable from the latter, but others will. The exam-
ple provided is one of those obtainable from (D) but not
(WD). Since (D) and (GD) are incomparable in strength,
they will have some conclusions that coincide (as above)
but there will also be conclusions obtained from (D) which
are not obtainable from (GD) and vice-versa. The example
provided for (D) is an instance of a conclusion obtainable
from (D) but not from (GD).
Definition 9 In BD, α can be deduced from an information
set Γ, written as Γ ⊢BD α, iff (Γ, α) is in the smallest
binary relation from PL to L closed under (B), (D⊥), and
(D).
BD has a well-behaved Tarskian consequence operation:
Proposition 5 CBD satisfies Inclusion, Idempotency,
Monotonicity and Compactness.
The manner in which disbeliefs are obtained from beliefs in
BD can be expressed by the following property which links
up a belief in ¬φ to a disbelief in φ. Observe that neither
WBD nor GBD satisfies (B → D).
(B→D) If Γ ⊢ ¬α then Γ ⊢ α
Proposition 6 ⊢BD satisfies (B→D) and does not satisfy
(B 6→D).
The logic BD does not support any connection between be-
liefs and disbeliefs in the converse direction, though, as the
following result shows.
Proposition 7 ⊢BD satisfies (D 6→B).
The different notions of inconsistency for BD are defined
in the same way as for WBD and GBD.
Definition 10 An information set Γ is B-inconsistent iff
ΓB ⊢BD ⊥, D-inconsistent iff ΓD ⊢BD ⊤, and BD-
inconsistent iff Γ ⊢BD φ and Γ ⊢BD φ for some φ ∈ LB .
Because there is interaction between beliefs and disbeliefs
in BD, there is also a connection between the different no-
tions of inconsistency for BD. In particular, we have the
following results.
Proposition 8 If Γ is B-inconsistent then it is also BD-
inconsistent, but the converse does not hold. Γ is BD-
inconsistent iff it is D-inconsistent.
In the logic BD, then, BD-inconsistency collapses into D-
inconsistency. Given the intuition of disbelief as a weaker
version of classical negation, this is a particularly desirable
state of affairs. In classical logic, asserting both φ and ¬φ
is tantamount to the assertion that ¬⊤ is the case, while in
BD, asserting both φ and φ amounts to the assertion that⊤
is the case.
Observe that BD-inconsistency (or D-inconsistency)
amounts to disbelieving the tautology, which leads to a dis-
belief in every sentence in LB . So, while B-inconsistency,
like classical consistency, leads to the acceptance of every
sentence in the language, BD-inconsistency leads only to
the acceptance of every disbelief in the language. BD-
inconsistency can thus be seen as a weaker version of clas-
sical inconsistency. We regard this as a particularly attrac-
tive feature of the logic BD. The logics WBD and GBD
also have similar features, but the connection between clas-
sical inconsistency and the weaker version of inconsis-
tency, based on disbeliefs, is not as intuitively appealing.
The semantics for BD is obtained by considering only those
WBD-models for which every N ∈ N is a subset of M .
That is, the worlds that the sources of an agent may re-
gard as possible have to be worlds that the agent itself re-
gards as possible. BD-entailment are defined as for WBD-
entailment and GBD-entailment.
Definition 11 A BD-model is a tuple (M,N ) where M ⊆
V and ∅ ⊂ N ⊆ PM . For a BD-modelM = (M,N ) and
φ ∈ LB , M  φ iff M ⊆ M(φ). For φ ∈ LD, M  φ iff
∃N ∈ N s.t. N ⊆ M(¬φ). M  Γ iff M  α ∀α ∈ Γ.
Γ BD α iff M  α for every BD-modelM s.t. M  Γ.
The logic BD is sound and complete.
Theorem 3 Γ ⊢BD α iff Γ BD α, for all α ∈ L.
Based on the semantics of BD we can define appropriate
notions of (un)satisfiability which can be shown to coin-
cide with inconsistency. We postpone presentation of these
details to the full version of this paper.
We conclude this section by pointing out that BD is able to
handle examples such as the lottery paradox and its vari-
ants (cf. examples 2 and 3) in a manner that is intuitively
satisfactory. It can be shown that any information set of the
form Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn,
∨
i≤n
i=1
φi} is neither B-inconsistent,
nor BD-inconsistent.4 BD thus allows us, for example, to
disbelieve the fact that any particular ticket will win the lot-
tery, while still believing that exactly one of the tickets will
win the lottery, without collapsing into any kind of incon-
sistency.
6 The logic BN
We have seen that BD allows for the generation of disbe-
liefs from beliefs. An interesting question is whether it
makes sense to do the opposite; that is, to generate beliefs
from disbeliefs. We consider two ways of doing so. For
the first one, note that the generation of disbeliefs from be-
liefs in BD is achieved by the inference rule (D). Now, it is
easily verified that, in the presence of (B) and (D⊥), (D) is
equivalent to the following property:
(D′) If Γ ⊢ ψ and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ ψ then Γ ⊢ φ
On the basis of this equivalence we consider the following
property:
(B′) If Γ ⊢ ψ and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ ψ then Γ ⊢ φ
(B′) asserts that if I currently believe ψ, and if the addition
of φ as a disbelief leads me to disbelieve ψ, then φ should
be one of my current beliefs. It is analogous to (D′), but
with the roles of beliefs and disbeliefs reversed. It turns
out, however, that (B′) is a derived rule of the logic BD.
Proposition 9 ⊢BD satisfies the property (B′).
A more direct way to obtain new beliefs from current dis-
beliefs is to consider the converse of the property (B→D).
(D→B) If Γ ⊢ φ then Γ ⊢ ¬φ.
Observe that WBD, GBD and BD do not satisfy (D→B).
A proof theory for the logic we call BN is then obtained by
adding (D→B) to the inference rules of BD.
Definition 12 For α ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L, α can be deduced
from Γ in BN, written as Γ ⊢BN α, iff (Γ, α) is in the
smallest binary relation from PL to L closed under (B),
(WD), (D⊥) and (D→B).
4By proposition 8 this means that Γ is also not D-inconsistent.
The introduction of (D→B) does indeed give us a logic that
is stronger than BD. It turns out, however, that disbelief
now collapses into classical negation
Theorem 4 For every φ ∈ LB, Γ ⊢BN φ iff Γ ⊢BN ¬φ.
BN is therefore exactly as expressive as PL.
7 Conclusion and future research
Of the four logics of belief and disbelief presented in this
paper, the logic BD is the most deserving of such a label.
BD covers all the motivations we have mentioned for the
explicit introduction of disbeliefs. Contraction with a be-
lief φ can be represented explicitly in BD as revision with
the disbelief φ, just as it can in WBD and GBD. This ability
has a useful side-effect as well. In classical belief change,
the result of the pathological case in which a belief set is
contracted with a tautology, is taken to be the belief set
itself, primarily because it is unclear what else the result
could be. In fact, it is the only case in which a contraction
does not succeed. But in BD (as in WBD and GBD), con-
traction by φ corresponds to a revision by φ. So contraction
by a tautology is equivalent to revising with the sentence⊤,
a disbelief in the tautology. Furthermore, it can be verified
that a disbelief in the tautology results in disbelieving all
(propositional) sentences, but has no effect on the current
beliefs. The explicit introduction of disbeliefs thus enables
us to devise a result which is much more in line with our
intuitions.
Like WBD and GBD, BD also provides a well-behaved
notion of consequence with respect to disbeliefs. In BD,
consequence with respect to disbeliefs is stronger than in
WBD but weaker than in GBD. In particular, (D) is satis-
fied in BD but not in WBD, and BD does not satisfy (D∨),
a property satisfied by GBD. As a result of not satisfy-
ing (D∨), consequence for BD is weak enough to allow
for the expression of agnosticism (disbelieving both φ and
¬φ) without collapsing into inconsistency. In this respect
it is superior to the logic GBD. At the same time, there is
a link between beliefs and disbeliefs in BD which is lack-
ing in both WBD and GBD, and which ensures that BD
is a suitable base logic for an extended version of belief
change in which it is possible to contract with disbeliefs as
well. The link between beliefs and disbeliefs also ensures
that disbelief, as defined in BD, is an appropriate weaker
version of classical negation, as is apparent from the fact
that BD satisfies (B→D) and (D 6→B), as well as from the
intuitively acceptable manner in which the lottery paradox
and its variants are handled.
If disbelief is truly to be viewed as a weaker version of
negation, it is necessary to conduct a proper investigation
into the connection between disbelief, classical negation,
and the other propositional connectives. In order to do so,
it is necessary to treat − as full-blown propositional con-
nective, in which sentences such as p ∨ q, ¬p, and p have a
well-defined meaning.
There is an obvious connection between beliefs and dis-
beliefs in BD and the modal logic operators of necessity
and possibility, specifically in the epistemic logic KD45
[8]. The statement ✷φ in KD45 corresponds to the asser-
tion that φ is believed, while ✸¬φ corresponds to the as-
sertion that ¬φ is possible, and hence that φ is disbelieved.
Observe, though, that statements in BD are object-level as-
sertions, or assertions from a first person perspective (“The
sky is blue”), while the corresponding statements in epis-
temic logics are meta-level assertions, or assertions from
a third person perspective (“The agent believes the sky is
blue”). However, the differences run slightly deeper and
are easily illustrated. To compare BD with KD45 we need
to restrict KD45 to sentences of the form ✷φ and ✸φ.
Then KD45 satisfies (B), (D⊥) and (D). So it is at least
as strong as BD. It does not satisfy (B 6→ D), and satisfies
(D 6→ B). It does not satisfy (Rej). It supports agnos-
ticism (I disbelieve φ as well as ¬φ) but does not satisfy
(D∨). In these respects it has the same behaviour as BD.
But it is stronger than BD. This can be seen by looking at
what happens when the tautology is disbelieved. In KD45
(indeed, in any normal modal logic i.e., one containing the
axiom schema K), if ✸(¬⊤) can be deduced from Γ, then
so can✷φ and✸φ for every propositional sentence φ. That
is, disbelieving ⊤ in KD45 leads to a belief as well as a
disbelief in every propositional sentence. In contrast dis-
believing the tautology in BD leads to a disbelief in every
propositional sentence, but our beliefs remain unaffected.
This is a particularly desirable property—as pointed out in
the discussion following Proposition 8.
In the full version of the paper we plan to develop a re-
stricted version of KD45 as defined above as a separate
logic of belief and disbelief. Developing an axiomatization
will be the primary task since the normal KD45 character-
ization requires a more expressive language than we pos-
sess at the moment. Furthermore, we will provide a formal
proof to the effect that the semantics of the logic BD is not
adequately captured by a class of Kripke models. Applica-
tions of the logics that we have developed to belief revision
is a non-trivial task that needs separate study.
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